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MANY-PLAYER GAMES OF OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND
INVESTMENT UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
Abstract. We study a portfolio optimization problem for competitive agents with CRRA
utilities and a common finite time horizon. The utility of an agent depends not only on her
absolute wealth and consumption but also on her relative wealth and consumption when
compared to the averages among the other agents. We derive a closed form solution for
the n-player game and the corresponding mean field game. This solution is unique in the
class of equilibria with constant investment and continuous time-dependent consumption,
both independent of the wealth of the agent. Compared to the classical Merton problem
with one agent, the competitive model exhibits a wide range of highly nonlinear and
non-monotone dependence on the agents’ risk tolerance and competitiveness parameters.
Counter-intuitively, competitive agents with high risk tolerance may behave like non-
competitive agents with low risk tolerance.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we extend the CRRA model for the optimal investment problem recently
developed by Lacker and Zariphopoulou [21] to include consumption. Our model can be
loosely described as follows, with full details given in Section 2. Each agent chooses con-
sumption and investment policies, with access to a riskless bond and a lognormal stock.
The stocks in which the different agents specialize can be correlated, and we cover the
extreme case of perfect correlation, i.e., a single stock in which all agents trade. Each
agent has a CRRA utility depending on both absolute and relative wealth at the (common)
time horizon T as well as absolute and relative consumption, the latter in a time-integrated
sense. Agents have different levels of risk aversion and different preferences toward absolute
versus relative performance. The relative performance criteria couple these n optimization
problems, and we find the (unique, in a sense to be clarified later) Nash equilibrium in
terms of the various model parameters. As is natural in light of the classical Merton prob-
lem [23], in equilibrium each agent invests a constant fraction of wealth in the stock, and
the consumption strategy is time-dependent but independent of the agent’s wealth.
The equilibrium behavior fits with Samuelson’s result [26]: the investment strategy is
independent of the consumption strategy. That is, the investment strategy is exactly the
same as in the model without consumption studied in [21]. The equilibrium consumption
policy, as a function of the various model parameters, displays even more highly nonlinear
and non-monotone behavior than the investment policy, and we study this in detail in
Section 4. Notably, each agent’s rate of consumption ct changes monotonically with time t
over the entire horizon [0, T ]; however, whether an agent increases or decreases consumption
over time depends in a complex manner on her own risk preferences as well as certain
aggregates of the other agents’ parameters.
Three key features of our model are relative consumption concerns, relative wealth
concerns, and asset specialization. We defer to the introduction of [21] for a thorough
discussion of the latter two topics and further references, but we stress the particularly
important and by now well-established point that mutual fund choice is highly influenced
by relative performance [28]. That is, out-performing other fund managers tends to attract
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2 DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
greater future investment in one’s own fund. The most closely related works to ours,
after [21], are [2, 3, 5, 11, 12, 14]. These papers study continuous-time models of optimal
investment under relative performance concerns in various settings, including different kinds
of utilities, equilibrium pricing, and state constraints, but none incorporate consumption.
There are two natural arguments for studying relative consumption concerns. On the
one hand, interpreting agents as fund managers, we may think of consumption as capital
accumulation, in the form of equipment, technology, or benefits for employees. A high
relative consumption in this sense would naturally attract clientele or better employees,
and more generally it should lead to similar benefits as a high relative wealth. On the
other hand, if we interpret the agents in our model as household investors, then relative
consumption concerns fit naturally with models of keeping up with the Joneses; this line of
literature directly incorporates the social aspects of investment and consumption decisions
[1, 9, 10, 15].
Our paper contributes to the literatures on optimal consumption and investment as well
as the application of mean field games. The dynamic problem of lifetime consumption and
investment planning with one player was formalized and studied in the landmark papers
of Merton [23, 24] and Samuelson [26]. Later work incorporated more complex features
into the models, such as general price processes, bankruptcy, etc. [19, 20]. Those that
incorporated multiple agents into the model, such as [18, 27], did so in an equilibrium
context; each agent’s behavior depends on the others only through the price, which is
determined in equilibrium. Agents are price-takers in our model, and we do not attempt
to incorporate price equilibrium, as this would severely strain tractability.
In another direction, our work provides a new explicitly solvable mean field game model.
Mean field games, introduced in [17, 22], are rarely explicitly solvable outside of linear-
quadratic examples. See [4, 6, 16, 21, 29] for some notable exceptions and the book [7]
for further background on the active area of mean field games. From a mean field game
perspective, our model is rather complex: It involves common noise, degenerate volatility
coefficients, singular objective functions, and a mean field interaction through both the
states and controls (i.e., an extended mean field game [7, Chapter I.4.6]). Nevertheless,
the precise structure of the problem lends itself to an explicit solution. Our argument
follows along the lines of [21], treating the mean field term (geometric mean of wealth)
as a state variable, which leads to a fixed point problem involving a single Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation as opposed to the n-dimensional HJB system often used
for stochastic differential games. After showing that this equation admits a unique and
separable classical solution, the fixed point is resolved via a system of non-linear ordinary
differential equations. Despite many similarities with [21], the consumption renders the
arguments substantially more involved.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate and solve the n-agent
model described above. Then, in Section 3, we study the infinite population counterpart
of this problem, arguing that the n→∞ limit results in a simpler form of the equilibrium.
Finally, Section 4 discusses and interprets the form of the equilibrium and its dependence
on the model parameters.
2. The n-agent game
In this section, we consider the n-player game, where each agent trades in a common
investment horizon [0, T ]. Agents may invest in their own specific stocks or in a common
riskless bond which offers zero interest rate. The price of stock i, in which only agent i
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trades, is given by the dynamics
dSit
Sit
= µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt, (1)
where the Brownian motions W 1, ...,Wn, B are independent and defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), which we endow with the natural filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by these
n + 1 Brownian motions, and where the market parameters are constants µi > 0, σi ≥ 0,
and νi ≥ 0, with σi+νi > 0. The prices Sit are assumed to be one-dimensional for simplicity,
although we could easily extend the results to k-dimensional prices.
This setup covers the important special case of a single stock, corresponding to the
situation where all the stocks are identical. That is, µi = µ, νi = 0, and σi = σ, for all
i = 1, ..., n and for some µ, σ > 0 independent of i, and so Si ≡ Sj for each i, j (assuming the
initial values agree). In the single stock case, the agents face the same market opportunities
rather than specializing in different assets, though their risk preferences still differ.
Each agent i chooses a self-financing strategy, (piit)t∈[0,T ], denoting the proportion of
wealth invested in the stock i, and a consumption policy, (cit)t∈[0,T ]. The wealth process of
agent i is then given by
dXit = pi
i
tX
i
t
(
µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt
)− citXitdt, Xi0 = xi0. (2)
Note that citX
i
t represents the instantaneous rate of consumption of agent i, so that c
i
t
is the rate per unit wealth. We say that a portfolio strategy is admissible if it belongs
to the set A of F-progressively measurable R × R+-valued process (pit, ct)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
E
∫ T
0 (pi
2
t + c
2
t )dt < ∞. Throughout the paper, R+ := (0,∞) denotes the strictly positive
reals, and we do not allow a consumption rate of zero. This is reasonable and less restrictive
than it may at first appear because the form of our utility functions, introduced in the
next paragraph, will ensure that agents’ marginal utilities approach +∞ as consumption
approaches zero. Note also that for any admissible portfolio strategy we have Xit > 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Indeed, we parametrized our consumption process as we did in (2) in part to
avoid the possibility of bankruptcy and in part to avoid imposing any state constraints.
The utility function of each agent belongs to the family of power (CRRA) utilities,
U(x; δ) =
{
1
1−1/δx
1−1/δ if δ 6= 1
log x if δ = 1,
defined for x, δ > 0. Agent i seeks to maximize the expected utility
Ji((pi
i, ci)ni=1) = E
[∫ T
0
U
(
citX
i
t(cXt)
−θi ; δi
)
dt+ iU
(
XiTX
−θi
T ; δi
)]
, (3)
defined for any vector of admissible strategies (pii, ci)ni=1 where (pi
i, ci) ∈ A for each i =
1, . . . , n. Here XT =
(∏n
k=1X
k
T
)1/n
and cXt =
(∏n
k=1(ctXt)
k
)1/n
are the population
(geometric) average wealth and consumption rate, respectively. The parameters δi > 0 and
θi ∈ [0, 1] represent respectively the ith agent’s risk tolerance and competition weight. We
apply the same utility function to both wealth and consumption for tractability reasons, but
we scale the utility of wealth with the parameter i > 0 to capture the relative importance
that the agent assigns to terminal wealth compared to consumption.
Our choice to work with geometric averages instead of arithmetic averages is also mo-
tivated by tractability: Just as the (arithmetic) average of independent Brownian motions
is again a Brownian motion, the geometric average of independent geometric Brownian
motions is again a geometric Brownian motion. It is worth emphasizing another form of
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the utility function, revealed by writing the terms inside the utility function as
citX
i
t(cXt)
−θi = (citX
i
t)
1−θi
(
citX
i
t
cXt
)θi
, XiTX
−θi
T = (X
i
T )
1−θi
(
XiT
XT
)θi
.
The ratios citX
i
t/cXt and X
i
T /XT measure the relative consumption rate and relative termi-
nal wealth, respectively. In particular, the utility function in (3) is applied to the log-convex
combination between absolute and relative consumption rate and terminal wealth, with θi
controlling the tradeoff between absolute and relative performance. For θi close to 1, agent
i is more concerned with relative performance than absolute performance, and for θi = 0
agent i is not at all competitive and ignores the rest of the population.
The goal is to find a Nash equilibrium, an investment strategy (~pi∗t ,~c∗t )t∈[0,T ] such that
pii,∗t and c
i,∗
t are respectively the optimal stock and consumption allocation exercised by
agent i in response to the strategy of all the other agents. With Merton’s problem and the
recent findings of [21] in mind, we might expect to find an equilibrium where the investment
strategies ~pi∗t are constant and the consumption strategies c
i,∗
t are only time-dependent.
Definition 2.1. We say that a vector (pii,∗, ci,∗)ni=1 of admissible strategies (i.e., (pi
i,∗ , ci,∗) ∈
A for each i) is an equilibrium if for each i = 1, ..., n and each (pi, c) ∈ A we have
Ji((pi
i,∗, ci,∗)ni=1) ≥ Ji
(
. . . , (pii−1,∗, ci−1,∗), (pi, c), (pii+1,∗, ci+1,∗), . . .
)
.
An equilibrium (pii,∗, ci,∗)ni=1 is called a strong equilibrium if, for each i, the process c
i,∗ is
deterministic and continuous, and the process pii,∗ is deterministic and constant.1
The main result is the following, which gives the explicit form of an equilibrium:
Theorem 2.2. Let n ≥ 2. Assume that for all i = 1, ..., n, we have xi0 > 0, δi > 0,
θi ∈ [0, T ], i > 0, µi > 0, σi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0, and σi + νi > 0. Then there is a unique strong
equilibrium (pii,∗, ci,∗)ni=1, and it takes the following form:
pii,∗ =
δiµi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1 + (δi − 1)θi/n)
− θi(δi − 1)σi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1 + (δi − 1)θi/n)
φ
1 + ψ
(4)
ci,∗t =

(
1
βi
+
(
1
λi
− 1βi
)
e−βi(T−t)
)−1
if βi 6= 0
(T − t+ λ−1i )−1 if βi = 0.
(5)
The constants (φ, ψ) and (βi, λi)
n
i=1 are given by
φ =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δk
µkσk
σ2k + ν
2
k(1 + (δk − 1)θk/n)
,
ψ =
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk(δk − 1) σ
2
k
σ2k + ν
2
k(1 + (δk − 1)θk/n)
,
βi = θi(δi − 1)
1
n
∑n
k=1 δkρk
1 + 1n
∑n
k=1 θk(δk − 1)
− δiρi,
λi = 
−δi
i
( n∏
k=1
δkk
)1/nθi(δi−1)/(1+ 1n
∑n
k=1 θk(δk−1))
, (6)
1This definition of equilibrium is more specifically of open-loop type, but a strong equilibrium, being
nonrandom, can be shown to also provide an equilibrium over closed-loop or Markovian controls.
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where we define also (ρi)
n
i=1 by
ρi = (1− 1/δi)
{
(1− θi/n)(µi − σiθi(1− 1/δi) 1n
∑
k 6=i σkpi
k,∗)2
2(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
+
1
2
(( 1
n
∑
k 6=i
σkpi
k,∗
)2
+
1
n2
∑
k 6=i
(νkpi
k,∗)2
)
θ2i (1− 1/δi)
− θi 1
n
∑
k 6=i
µkpi
k,∗ +
θi
2n
∑
k 6=i
(σ2k + ν
2
k)(pi
k,∗)2
}
,
Moreover, we have the identity
1
n
n∑
k=1
σkpi
k,∗ =
φ
1 + ψ
. (7)
Note that δi = 1 implies βi = 0, which means that log-investors always use the second
form of ci,∗t given in (5). The form of the equilibrium does not seem to simplify much
further, except in the single stock case:
Corollary 2.3. (Single stock) Assume that for all i = 1, ..., n we have µi = µ > 0, σi =
σ > 0, and νi = 0. Then there is a unique strong equilibrium (pi
i,∗, ci,∗)ni=1, and it takes the
following form:
pii,∗ =
µ
σ2
(
δi − θi
θcrit
(δi − 1)
)
(8)
ci,∗t =

(
1
βi
+
(
1
λi
− 1βi
)
e−βi(T−t)
)−1
if βi 6= 0,
(T − t+ λ−1i )−1 if βi = 0.
(9)
For each i, the constant λi is given by (6), and βi and θcrit are given by
βi =
µ2
2σ2
(1− δi)
(
1− θi
θcrit
)(
δi − θi
θcrit
(δi − 1)
)
,
θcrit =
1 + 1n
∑n
k=1 θk(δk − 1)
1
n
∑n
k=1 δk
.
In Section 3 we simplify this further by sending n→∞. Then, in Section 4, we analyze
in detail how the equilibrium behavior depends on the various parameters.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. First, we fix an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and suppose that all other
players follow given strategies. That is, for k 6= i, let pik ∈ R and ck : [0, T ] → R+ denote
fixed admissible strategies for the other agents, in which the investment policy pik is constant
and the consumption policy ck is a deterministic continuous function. We will solve the
optimization problem for agent i, determining the agent’s best response to the competitors’
strategies. Then, we will resolved the resulting fixed point problem.
Define Yt := (
∏
k 6=iX
k
t )
1/n, where Xkt solves (2) subject to the strategies (pik, ck), with
Xk0 = x
k
0. We use the following abbreviations:
Σk = σ
2
k + ν
2
k µ̂pi−i =
1
n
∑
k 6=i µkpik, σ̂pi−i =
1
n
∑
k 6=i σkpik,
Σ̂pi2−i = 1n
∑
k 6=i Σkpi
2
k, (̂νpi)
2−i =
1
n
∑
k 6=i ν
2
kpi
2
k, ĉ−i(t) =
1
n
∑
k 6=i ck(t).
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A straightforward calculation with Itoˆ’s formula (cf. the proof of Theorem 14 in [21]) shows
that the process Yt satisfies
dYt
Yt
= (ηi − ĉ−i(t))dt+ 1
n
∑
k 6=i
νkpikdW
k
t + σ̂pi−idBt, (10)
where we define also
ηi = µ̂pi−i −
1
2
(
Σ̂pi2−i − σ̂pi2−i −
1
n
(̂νpi)2−i
)
.
The ith agent then solves the optimization problem
sup
(pii,ci)∈A
E
[∫ T
0
U
(
(citX
i
t)
1−θi/n(c¯−i(t)Yt)−θi ; δi
)
dt+ iU
((
XiT
)1−θi/n Y −θiT ; δi)] , (11)
where c¯−i(t) =
(∏
k 6=i ck(t)
)1/n
and2
dXit = pi
i
tX
i
t(µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt)− citXitdt, Xi0 = xi0,
with (Yt)t∈[0,T ] solving (10). Treating (Xi, Y ) as the state process, we solve this stochastic
optimal control problem by noting that the value (11) should equal v(Xi0, Y0, 0), where
v(x, y, t) solves the HJB equation
0 = vt + sup
pi∈R
[
pi(µixvx + σiσ̂pi−ixyvxy) +
1
2
pi2Σix
2vxx
]
+ sup
c∈R+
[
−cxvx + U
(
(cx)(1−θi/n)(c¯−i(t)y)−θi ; δi
)]
+ (ηi − ĉ−i(t))yvy + 1
2
(
1
n
(̂νpi)2−i + σ̂pi
2
−i
)
y2vyy,
(12)
for (x, y, t) ∈ R+ × R+ × [0, T ), with terminal condition
v(x, y, T ) = iU(x
1−θi/ny−θi ; δi). (13)
Notice that the two suprema in (12) are finite if vxx < 0 and vx > 0, so we assume for the
moment that this is the case, and we will ultimately check that our solution does satisfy
these constraints. If follows from a standard verification theorem that there can be at most
one classical solution of this PDE. Since the utility takes a different form depending on
whether or not δi = 1, we treat these two cases separately in the next part of the proof.
The case δi 6= 1: The utility function takes the form
U
(
(cx)(1−θi/n)(c¯−i(t)y)−θi ; δi
)
=
(
1− 1
δi
)−1
(cx)(1−θi/n)(1−1/δi)(c¯−i(t)y)−θi(1−1/δi).
Applying the first order conditions, the suprema in (12) are attained by
pii,∗(x, y, t) = −µixvx(x, y, t) + σiσ̂pi−ixyvxy(x, y, t)
Σix2vxx(x, y, t)
, (14)
and
ci,∗(x, y, t) =
1
x
(
(1− θin )(c¯−i(t)y)−θi(1−1/δi)
vx(x, y, t)
) 1
1−(1−θi/n)(1−1/δi)
. (14’)
2We use a bar c to denote a geometric average and a hat ĉ to denote an arithmetic average.
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Let us introduce the following constants:
γi =
1
1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi) , (15)
Γi =
(
1− θi
n
)γi ( 1
γi − 1
)
.
Using these constants and the expressions (14) and (14’), the HJB equation (12) becomes
0 = vt − 1
2
(µixvx + σiσ̂pi−ixyvxy)2
Σix2vxx
+
1
2
(
σ̂pi2−i +
1
n
(̂νpi)2−i
)
y2vyy + (ηi − ĉ−i(t))yvy
+ (vx)
1−γi(c¯−i(t)y)−γiθi(1−1/δi)Γi.
(16)
We now make the ansatz
v(x, y, t) = i
(
1− 1
δi
)−1
x(1−θi/n)(1−1/δi)y−θi(1−1/δi)fi(t), (17)
for a differentiable function fi : [0, T ] → R to be determined. Note that the boundary
condition (13) requires fi(T ) = 1. Plugging this into the HJB equation (16), we find that
v(x, y, t)/fi(t) factors out of each term, and we get
0 = f ′i(t) +
(
ρi + θi
(
1− 1
δi
)
ĉ−i(t)
)
fi(t) +
−γii
γi
c¯−i(t)−γiθi(1−1/δi)fi(t)1−γi , (18)
where we define
ρi =
(
1− 1
δi
)(
γi(1− θi/n)(µi − σiσ̂pi−iθi(1− 1/δi))2
2Σi
+
1
2
(σ̂pi2−i +
1
n
(̂νpi)2−i)θ
2
i (1− 1/δi)− θiµ̂pi−i +
θi
2
Σ̂pi2−i
)
.
(19)
Indeed, the last term in (18) comes from the identity
vx(x, y, t)
1−γiy−γiθi(1−1/δi) = −γii
(
1− θi
n
)1−γi (
1− 1
δi
)
fi(t)
−γiv(x, y, t).
To solve (18), let us for the moment abbreviate
ai(t) := ρi + θi(1− 1/δi)ĉ−i(t), bi(t) := 
−γi
i
γi
c¯−i(t)−γiθi(1−1/δi). (20)
Then (18) rewrites as
f ′i + aifi + bif
1−γi
i = 0.
This is an example of a Bernoulli equation, and a well known change of variables leads to
the solution. Indeed, and divide by f1−γii (after noting that γi > 0) and use the substitution
ui(t) = f
γi
i (t), so that (18) becomes the linear differential equation
1
γi
u′i + aiui + bi = 0,
with terminal condition ui(T ) = 1. This linear equation admits the unique solution
ui(t) = e
γi
∫ T
t ai(s)ds +
∫ T
t
γibi(s)e
−γi
∫ s
t ai(r)drds.
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Note that bi is positive everywhere, and thus so is ui. Hence, u
1/γi
i is well defined, and the
unique solution to (18) is given by
fi(t) =
(
eγi
∫ T
t ai(s)ds +
∫ T
t
γibi(s)e
−γi
∫ s
t ai(r)drds
)1/γi
. (21)
Substituting this solution (21) into the ansatz (17) yields the solution v(x, y, t) of the HJB
equation, as long as we check that vxx < 0 and vx > 0. But this is straightforward:
vx(x, y, t) = i(1− θi/n)x−1/γiy−θi(1−1/δi)fi(t) > 0,
vxx(x, y, t) = − i
γi
(1− θi/n)x−1/γi−1y−θi(1−1/δi)fi(t) < 0,
where we again use γi > 0. Therefore, in terms of fi, we may express the optimal controls
from (14) and (14’) as
pii,∗ =
γi(µi − σiσ̂pi−iθi(1− 1/δi))
Σi
,
ci,∗t = 
−γi
i (c¯−i(t))
−γiθi(1−1/δi)f−γii (t).
(22)
The case δi = 1: In the case δi = 1 we must proceed differently, but we will ultimately
derive optimal controls that are consistent with the formulas in (22). Note first that we
may greatly simplify the form of (11), because the logarithmic utility function implies in
particular that the other players no longer influence player i’s optimization. That is, player
i maximizes the simplified objective
(1− θi/n)E
[∫ T
0
log(citX
i
t)dt+ i logX
i
T
]
. (23)
Noting that 1− θi/n > 0, the value (23) is equal to (1− θi/n)w(Xi0, 0), where w(x, t) solves
the HJB equation
0 = wt + max
pi∈R
[
piµixwx + pi
2 1
2
Σix
2wxx
]
+ max
c∈R+
[−cxwx + log(cx)] , (24)
for (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T ), with terminal condition w(x, T ) = i log x. The maximum is
attained by
pii,∗(x, t) = − µixwx(x, t)
Σix2wxx(x, t)
, ci,∗(x, t) =
1
xwx(x, t)
. (25)
The HJB equation (24) then becomes
0 = wt − 1
2
(µixwx)
2
Σix2wxx
− 1− logwx. (26)
Make the ansatz
w(x, t) = fi(t)i log x+ gi(t),
where fi and gi are to be determined and satisfy fi(T ) = 1 and gi(T ) = 0. Plug this into
(26), defining the constant ρ̂i = µ
2
i i/2Σi, to get(
if
′
i(t) + 1
)
log x+ g′i(t) + ρ̂ifi(t)− 1− log i − log fi(t) = 0.
Since there is only one term depending on x, we must have
if
′
i(t) + 1 = 0, fi(T ) = 1.
This yields fi(t) = 
−1
i (T − t) + 1. Then gi must solve
g′i(t) = −ρ̂i(−1i (T − t) + 1) + 1 + log((T − t) + i),
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which is easily integrated using gi(T ) = 0 to get the solution gi, though we will not need to
use it explicitly. Note also that fi > 0, and thus wx > 0 and wxx < 0 everywhere. We have
therefore solved the HJB when δi = 1. Recalling (25), we deduce that the optimal controls
are
pii,∗ =
µi
Σi
, ci,∗t =
1
T − t+ i . (27)
Note that the result (22) obtained above specializes to (27) when δi = 1. Indeed, if δi = 1,
then ρi = 0 and γi = 1, and the functions ai and bi defined in (20) reduce to ai ≡ 0 and
bi ≡ 1/i. Thus (21) becomes fi(t) = −1i (T − t) + 1, and (22) becomes (27).
Completing the proof: We now complete the proof, using the form we found above for
the optimal control of player i in response to the other players’ choices. Namely, the best
response of player i is given by the controls in (22), where fi is defined as in (21), and we
have seen that these formulas are valid for both cases δi = 1 and δi 6= 1.
Note that if we assume that the other consumption functions are positive and con-
tinuous, then the optimal feedback consumption that we have found is also positive and
continuous on [0, T ]. Now, to conclude the proof, note that the original choice of (pii, ci)
n
i=1
is a strong equilibrium if and only if for each i = 1, ..., n, we have
pii,∗ = pii and c
i,∗
t = ci(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where (pii,∗, ci,∗) were given in (22).
We first address the investment policy. Note that we obtained exactly the same optimal
control pii,∗ as in the problem without consumption, and we can conclude as in the proof of
[21, Theorem 14] that pii,∗ = pii for all i = 1, ..., n if and only if pii,∗ is as in (4). In addition,
we prove the identity (7) just as in [21, Theorem 14]. Recall that ρi defined in (19) depends
on the investment policies pik of the other agents but not on the consumption policies; in
particular, in equilibrium we have
ρi :=
(
1− 1
δi
){(1− θi/n)(µi − σiθi(1− 1/δi) 1n∑k 6=i σkpik,∗)2
2(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
+
1
2
θ2i
(
1− 1
δi
)(( 1
n
∑
k 6=i
σkpi
k,∗
)2
+
1
n
∑
k 6=i
(νkpi
k,∗)2
)
− θi 1
n
∑
k 6=i
µkpi
k,∗ +
θi
2n
∑
k 6=i
(σ2k + ν
2
k)(pi
k,∗)2
} (28)
Next, we address the consumption policies. In light of our arguments above, in order
to have an equilibrium, we must simultaneously solve the following system of equations, for
i = 1, . . . , n:
ci(t) = 
−γi
i (c¯−i(t))
−γiθi(1−1/δi)(fi(t))−γi (29)
0 = f ′i(t) + (ρi + θi(1− 1/δi)ĉ−i(t))fi(t) +
−γii
γi
c¯−i(t)−γiθi(1−1/δi)fi(t)1−γi , (30)
with fi(T ) = 1. Indeed, the first equation gives the best response of agent i in terms of
the other agents’ strategies (computed in (22)) and the function fi. The second equation is
exactly the differential equation which determined fi, which we solved explicitly in terms
of the other agents’ strategies in (21). However, now that we have verified the validity of
the ansatz for vi(x, y, t), to resolve the equilibrium it is more convenient to abandon the
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explicit form for fi and instead solve the equations (29) and (30) simultaneously. To do
this, first plug (29) into the last term of (30) to find
f ′i(t) +
(
ρi + θi
(
1− 1
δi
)
ĉ−i(t) +
1
γi
ci(t)
)
fi(t) = 0.
Defining the full average ĉ(t) = 1n
∑n
k=1 ck(t), note that ĉ−i(t) = ĉ(t) − ci(t)/n. Recalling
the definition of γi in (15), we deduce that
f ′i(t) +
(
ρi + θi
(
1− 1
δi
)
ĉ(t) +
1
δi
ci(t)
)
fi(t) = 0.
Hence, with fi(T ) = 1 this leads to
fi(t) = exp
(∫ T
t
(
ρi + θi
(
1− 1
δi
)
ĉ(s) +
1
δi
ci(s)
)
ds
)
. (31)
Now notice that (29) is equivalent to
ci(t)
1−γi(θi/n)(1−1/δi) = −γii c¯(t)
−γiθi(1−1/δi)fi(t)−γi ,
where c¯(t) denotes the full geometric average, c¯(t) := (
∏n
k=1 ck(t))
1/n. Hence, recalling the
definition of γi in (15),
ci(t) = (ifi(t))
− γi
1−γi(θi/n)(1−1/δi) c¯(t)
− γiθi(1−1/δi)
1−γi(θi/n)(1−1/δi) = (ifi(t))
−δi c¯(t)−θi(δi−1).
Next, plug in the expression for fi from (31) to get
ci(t) = 
−δi
i c¯(t)
−θi(δi−1) exp
(
−δi
∫ T
t
(
ρi + θi
(
1− 1
δi
)
ĉ(s) +
1
δi
ci(s)
)
ds
)
,
which is equivalent to
ci(t) exp
(∫ T
t
ci(s)ds
)
= −δii c¯(t)
−θi(δi−1)e−δiρi(T−t) exp
(
−θi(δi − 1)
∫ T
t
ĉ(s)ds
)
. (32)
Taking the geometric mean over i = 1, . . . , n, we get
c¯(t) exp
(∫ T
t
ĉ(s)ds
)
=
(
δ
)−1
c¯(t)−̂θ(δ−1)e−δ̂ρ(T−t) exp
(
− ̂θ(δ − 1)
∫ T
t
ĉ(s)ds
)
,
where we defined
̂θ(δ − 1) := 1n
∑n
k=1 θk(δk − 1), δ̂ρ := 1n
∑n
k=1 δkρk, and 
δ :=
(∏n
k=1 
δk
k
)1/n
.
Thus,
c¯(t) exp
(∫ T
t
ĉ(s)ds
)
=
(
δ
)− 1
1+ ̂θ(δ−1) e
− δ̂ρ
1+ ̂θ(δ−1)
(T−t)
.
Plugging this expression into (32), we get
ci(t) exp
(∫ T
t
ci(s)ds
)
= λie
βi(T−t), (33)
where we define
βi := θi(δi − 1) δ̂ρ
1 + ̂θ(δ − 1)
− δiρi,
λi := 
−δi
i
(
δ
) θi(δi−1)
1+ ̂θ(δ−1) > 0.
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 11
Integrate (33) from t to T and take the logarithm to get∫ T
t
ci(s)ds =
{
log
(
1 + λiβi
(
eβi(T−t) − 1)) if βi 6= 0
log (λi(T − t) + 1) if βi = 0.
(34)
This is indeed well defined because, when βi 6= 0, the function t 7→ 1 + λiβi
(
eβi(T−t) − 1) is
decreasing on [0, T ] and equal to 1 at t = T . Differentiating both sides, we finally obtain
ci(t) =

(
1
βi
+
(
1
λi
− 1βi
)
e−βi(T−t)
)−1
if βi 6= 0
(T − t+ λ−1i )−1 if βi = 0.
In summary, we have found the unique solution of the system of equations given in (29)
and (30), justifying our ansatz for the HJB equation (12). With a classical solution of
the HJB equation in hand, by a standard verification argument [13, 25] we conclude that
the portfolio and consumption policies identified above do indeed provide the unique best
responses and thus the unique strong equilibrium. 
3. The mean field game
We study in this section the limit as n→∞ of the n-player game analyzed previously,
and we explain how the limit can be viewed as the equilibrium outcome of a (mean field)
game with a continuum of agents. For each agent i, define the type vector
ζi := (x
i
0, δi, θi, i, µi, νi, σi).
We now allow these parameters to depend also on n, though we will not burden the nota-
tion with an additional index. These type vectors induce an empirical measure, the type
distribution, which is the probability measure on the type space
Z := (0,∞)× (0,∞)× [0, 1]× (0,∞)× (0,∞)× [0,∞)× [0,∞),
given by mn =
1
n
∑n
k=1 δζk . Now note that for each agent i, the equilibrium strategy for
the consumption as well as the investment only depends on the agent’s own type vector
and on the distribution mn of the type vectors. Hence, if we assume mn converges weakly
to some limiting probability measure, then we expect the equilibrium outcome to converge
in a certain sense.
In order to pass to the limit, let us now denote by (x0, δ, θ, , µ, ν, σ) a Z-valued random
variable, with ν+σ > 0 a.s. This law of this random type vector represents the distribution
of type vectors of a continuum of agents, and a single realization of this random type vector
is to be interpreted as the type assigned to a single representative agent. We assume that
all expectations appearing in this paragraph are finite. The n → ∞ limiting forms of the
constants φ and ψ defined in Theorem 2.2 are as follows:
φ = E
[
δµσ
σ2 + ν2
]
, ψ = E
[
θ(δ − 1)σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
. (35)
To identify limiting forms of the remaining quantities in Theorem 2.2, we additionally
remove the i subscript, letting the randomness of the type vector play the role of the names
of the agents. This gives
β = θ(δ − 1) E [δρ]
1 + E [θ(δ − 1)] − δρ, (36)
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and
ρ =
(
1− 1
δ
){
δ
2(σ2 + ν2)
(
µ− σ φ
1 + ψ
θ(1− 1/δ)
)2
+
1
2
(
φ
1 + ψ
)2
θ2(1− 1/δ)
− θ φ
1 + ψ
E
[
δµ2 − θ(δ − 1)σµ
σ2 + ν2
]
+
θ
2
E
[
(δµ− θ(δ − 1)σ φ1+ψ )2
σ2 + ν2
]}
.
(37)
The limiting form of λi is given by
λ = −δ
(
eE[log(
−δ)]
)− θ(δ−1)
1+E[θ(δ−1)]
. (38)
Indeed, this is determined by noting that(
n∏
k=1
δkk
)1/n
= exp
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
log(δkk )
)
.
The equilibrium investment policy of Theorem 2.2 of the representative agent then becomes
pi∗ =
δµ
σ2 + ν2
− θ(δ − 1)σ
σ2 + ν2
φ
1 + ψ
(39)
and the consumption policy becomes
c∗t =

(
1
β +
(
1
λ − 1β
)
e−β(T−t)
)−1
if β 6= 0
(T − t+ λ−1)−1 if β = 0.
(40)
We next illustrate how this strategy arises as the equilibrium of a mean field game. Let
(Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) be a filtered probability space supporting independent Brownian
motions B and W as well as a random type vector ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, , µ, ν, σ) as above. Assume
that F is the minimal complete filtration with respect to which ζ is F0-measurable and W
and B are F-Brownian motions. The representative agent’s wealth process is determined
by
dXt = pitXt(µdt+ νdWt + σdBt)− ctXtdt. (41)
As before, admissible strategies are given by F-progressively measurable R × R+-valued
processes (pi, c) satisfying E
∫ T
0 (pi
2
t + c
2
t )dt <∞, and every admissible strategy results in a
strictly positive wealth process.
Because this is a mean field game with common noise B, the mean field equilibrium
condition will involve conditional means given B. Intuitively, because the interaction be-
tween the agents occurs through the (geometric) average over the whole population, we
expect some kind of a law of large numbers and asymptotic independence between the
agents as n → ∞. Due to the presence of common noise, any asymptotic independence
between the agents must be conditional on the common noise B, and we refer to [7, 8] for
more thorough and precise treatments of mean field games with common noise. In other
words, the population average wealth and consumption processes should be adapted to the
complete filtration FB = (FBt )t∈[0,T ] generated by the common noise B. Now, suppose
that the representative agent knows that the geometric mean wealth and consumption of
the (continuum of) other agents are governed by some FB-adapted processes X and Γ,
respectively. Then, the objective of the representative agent is to maximize the expected
payoff
sup
(pi,c)∈AMF
E
[∫ T
0
U
(
ctXt(ΓtXt)
−θ; δ
)
dt+ U
(
XTX
−θ
T ; δ
)]
. (42)
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In equilibrium, the optimal (pi∗, c∗) for this problem should lead to expE[logXt | FBt ] = Xt
and expE[log c∗t | FBt ] = Γt, where we note that expE[log(·)] is the continuous analogue of
geometric mean. We formalize this discussion in the following definition:
Definition 3.1. Let (pi∗, c∗) be admissible strategies, and consider the FB-adapted pro-
cesses Xt := expE[logX∗t |FBt ] and Γt = expE[log c∗t |FBt ], where (X∗t )t∈[0,T ] is the wealth
process in (41) corresponding to the strategy (pi∗, c∗). We say that (pi∗, c∗) is a mean
field equilibrium if (pi∗, c∗) is optimal for the optimization problem (42) corresponding to
this choice of X and Γ. We call (pi∗, c∗) a strong equilibrium if pi∗ is constant (and thus
F0-measurable) and if (c∗t )t∈[0,T ] is continuous and F0-measurable.
Because F0 is the σ-field generated by the type vector, to say that a strategy is F0-
measurable simply means that it depends on the type vector only, not on the Brownian
motions or wealth process. We may now state a theorem which explains the precise sense
in which the n→∞ limiting strategies computed above can be viewed as the equilibrium
outcome of a mean field game.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that a.s. δ > 0, θ ∈ [0, 1],  > 0, µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, and
σ+ ν > 0. Define (φ, ψ, β, ρ, λ) as in (35)–(38), and assume all of the expectations therein
are finite. Then there is a unique strong equilibrium (pi∗, c∗), and it takes the form given
by (39) and (40).
Corollary 3.3. (Single Stock) Assume that (µ, ν, σ) is deterministic with ν = 0 and µ, σ >
0. Then β defined in (36) can be simplified to
β =
µ2
2σ2
(1− δ)
(
1− θ
θcrit
)(
δ − θ
θcrit
(δ − 1)
)
,
where
θcrit :=
1 + E[θ(δ − 1)]
E[δ]
,
and the optimal investment simplifies to
pi∗ =
(
δ − θ
θcrit
(δ − 1)
)
µ
σ2
.
We omit the proof, because it closely parallels the proofs of Theorem 2.2 and [21,
Theorem 3.6]. The main idea, as in the proof of Theorem 2.2, is to identify the dynamics of
the process Xt = expE[logXt | FBt ], when X is subject to F0-measurable strategies (pi, c),
with pi time-independent. The representative agent’s optimization problem can then be cast
as a (tractable) stochastic control problem over the two-dimensional state process (X,X).
4. Discussion of the equilibrium
We now discuss the interpretation of the equilibria computed in the previous sections
and the nature of the dependence on the various model parameters. First, notice that our
result is consistent with Samuelson’s [26], in the sense that the investment strategy we
obtain is the same as in the model without consumption, derived in the previous work [21].
More generally, the investment strategy pi∗ does not depend on the relative importance that
the agents give to terminal wealth versus consumption, quantified by  in our model. With
this in mind, we refer to [21] for the discussion on the investment strategy, and we focus
the rest of the discussion here on the consumption strategy.
We further limit the discussion of the equilibrium to the mean field case, for which the
equilibrium consumption policy is given by (40), as the equilibrium in the n-agent game
has essentially the same structure but more complicated formulas. Moreover, we restrict
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our attention mostly to the single stock case of Corollary 3.3, which is again more tractable
but already quite rich.
From the expression for c∗t , we can distinguish three regimes of consumption behavior.
The optimal consumption is necessarily a monotone function of time t, and a quick compu-
tation shows that it is increasing when β < λ, decreasing when β > λ and constant when
β = λ. Recalling the form of the wealth process X in (41), we see that the expected rate
of return of wealth, ddtE[logXt | F0], is also a monotone function of time, with the oppo-
site monotonicity of the consumption policy. (Note that conditioning on F0 is equivalent to
conditioning on the representative agent’s type.) See Figure 1 for some typical consumption
policies.
Figure 1. Equilibrium consumption c∗t versus t for various values of δ.
The parameters are µ = 5, σ = 1,  = 1, E[log(δ)] = 0, E[θ(δ − 1)] = 0.8,
E[δ] = 3, θ = 0.8, and T = 1. Note that the final consumption c∗T = λ does
not depend on δ.
Recall that  captures the relative importance that an agent gives to terminal wealth
compared to consumption. Note that λ→∞ as → 0, and in particular we have β < λ for
small . As discussed above, this means the agent aims for a decreasing rate of growth of
wealth and an increasing rate of consumption. This is natural, because a small  indicates
the agent’s lack of interest in terminal wealth, which drives X(t) toward zero as t→ T (as
there is no bequest in our model). That is, for  sufficiently small, the agent dis-invests
after some time in order to consume more. In fact, the agent may even begin dis-investing
immediately if pi∗ < c∗(0). On the contrary, if  is large, the agent is more concerned
with terminal wealth than consumption and will thus decrease her consumption over time.
Indeed, λ is decreasing in , so for large  we have β > λ.
We now turn to the key question of the impact of an agent’s competitiveness and risk
tolerance on her consumption behavior. To simplify the discussion, let us assume henceforth
that no agent has a preference between her utility of wealth or utility of consumption; that
is,  = 1 and E[log(−δ)] = 0, which in particular implies λ = 1. Note that if θ = 0, then
we recover the classical Merton solution without competition, with β = µ
2
2σ2
δ(1 − δ) and
pi∗ = δµ/σ2. For general θ, we may still rewrite β and pi∗ in an analogous manner as
β =
µ2
2σ2
δeff(1− δeff), pi∗ = δeffµ/σ2,
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where we define the effective risk tolerance parameter
δeff :=
(
1− θ
θcrit
)
δ +
θ
θcrit
.
In other words, in the face of competition, the agent behaves like a Merton investor/consumer
but with a different risk tolerance parameter. We can interpret δeff as a weighted average
of the agent’s own risk tolerance δ and the critical log-investor case δlog = 1, with the
weight determined by the agent’s competitiveness. Take note, however, that the range of
the weight θ/θcrit is [0,∞) and δeff can be negative, so we should avoid interpreting δeff too
literally as a risk tolerance parameter.
Let us investigate in more detail what distinguishes between agents who decrease versus
increase their consumption over time, and let us continue to assume that  ≡ 1 (and thus
λ ≡ 1) for all agents. As discussed above, an agent increases her consumption over time if
and only if β < λ = 1. If 8σ2 > µ2, then we always have β < 1, because δeff(1− δeff) ≤ 1/4
for any δeff . So assume instead that 8σ
2 < µ2. Then, because β is a quadratic function of
δ (if all other parameters are held fixed), we may find δ∗± such that
β > 1 ⇐⇒ δ ∈ (δ∗−, δ∗+).
That is, the agent decreases consumption over time if δ∗− < δ < δ∗+, increases consumption
over time if δ /∈ (δ∗−, δ∗+), and consumes at a constant rate if δ ∈ {δ∗−, δ∗+}. Precisely, these
two values are
δ∗± := 1 +
1
2
(
1
θ/θcrit − 1
±
√
1− 8σ2/µ2∣∣θ/θcrit − 1∣∣
)
.
(If θ = θcrit, then β = 0, so let us assume θ 6= θcrit.) This explains the non-monotonicity in
δ of the equilibrium consumption strategy, as well as the wave-like shape of the curve of c∗t
versus δ and θ pictured in Figure 2. In the classical Merton problem with no competition,
recovered by setting θ = 0, the endpoints become δ∗± =
1
2(1±
√
1− 8σ2/µ2), both of which
are less than 1; in this case only risk averse (δ < 1) agents decrease their consumption over
time. In contrast, in the competitive case θ > 0, the interval (δ−, δ+) may lie above or
below 1 depending on the sign of 1− θ/θcrit.
On the one hand, suppose the agent is less competitive than the critical value, or
θ < θcrit. Then δ
∗− < δ∗+ < 1, and we have seen that the agent will decrease her rate
of consumption over time only if her risk tolerance lies within the range (δ∗−, δ∗+). As we
would expect, a relatively uncompetitive agent behaves similarly to a Merton investor in
this respect. On the other hand, if the agent is more competitive than the critical value, or
θ > θcrit, then 1 < δ
∗− < δ∗+. This means that even highly risk tolerant agents may decrease
consumption over time. Noting that δeff decreases with θ, one interpretation is as follows:
Increasing θ exposes an agent to relative performance pressures, which is itself a source
of risk, and to offset this additional risk the agent behaves like a Merton investor with a
smaller risk tolerance parameter.
Note that a highly competitive agent, with θ > θcrit, behaves in a sense opposite to how
they would if θ = 0. Indeed, when θ > θcrit, the effective risk tolerance δeff is less than 1 if
δ > 1 and greater than 1 if δ < 1. The agent effectively switches to the other side of the
critical risk tolerance δlog = 1.
We have seen by now how, with other parameters held fixed, the consumption policy
may depend non-monotonically on the risk tolerance δ, with an intermediate range of risk
tolerance parameters (δ∗−, δ∗+) in which agents decrease consumption over time. Similarly,
with other parameters held fixed, consumption can exhibit the same non-monotonicities as
a function of θ, with an intermediate range (θ∗−, θ∗+) in which agents decrease consumption
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Figure 2. Optimal consumption versus (δ, θ) at time T/2. The parameters
are µ = 5, σ = 1,  = 1, E[log ] = 0, E[θ(δ − 1)] = 1.6, E[δ] = 5, and T = 1.
over time. See Figure 3 for a depiction of the range of (δ, θ) parameters leading agents to
decrease versus increase consumption over time.
Figure 3. Consumption regime versus (δ, θ). An agent with (δ, θ) lying
inside (resp. outside) the shaded region decreases (resp. increases) consump-
tion rate over time. Agents on the boundary consume at a constant rate.
Note there is a small unshaded wedge near the origin. The parameters are
µ = 5, σ = 1,  = 1, E[log ] = 0, E[θ(δ − 1)] = 1.6, E[δ] = 5. Here
θcrit = 0.52.
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